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Abstract 
 
Pension systems’ reforms are often related to a shift towards (fully or partially) defined 
contribution systems, in which the pension distribution reflects to a larger extent the wage 
distribution. Additionally, relatively shorter working lives of those that have lower earnings, 
increase the risk of receiving lower benefits.  
  
The aim of the paper is to present the changing role of minimum pension as a tool of 
redistribution in Poland after the pension reform. The new mandatory pension system covers 
workers born after 1948 and is based on two components – notional and funded defined 
contribution (NDC and FDC). It replaced the old defined-benefit PAYG system, which had a 
significant redistribution through the pension formula. The formula itself served as a tool of 
low income protection, that was additionally strengthened by the minimum pension guarantee. 
The new system aims at actuarial fairness, which means that the only mechanism of 
redistribution is the minimum pension, financed from general taxes.  
 
As a result of this change, grater income inequalities of pensioners following those of people 
in working age are expected. This means a change of the role of the minimum pension from 
one of the tools supporting redistributive policy to the main tool of social policy preventing 
poverty among elderly persons.  
 
The minimum pension is expected to fall compared to average wage. The decision on its level 
and evolution becomes one of the most important policy questions. It will have crucial 
importance in preventing poverty in the old-age. Simulations are used to present the impact of 
changes in the pension distribution on the number of pensioners covered by minimum 
pension.  
                                                 
1
 mail: Agnieszka.Chlon-Dominczak@ibs.org.pl  
2
 mail: strzeleckip@gmail.com 
3
 The authors would like to thank Social Insurance Institution, in particular Ms Hanna Zalewska, Head of 
Statistics Department and Ms Izabela Tomczyk for providing data and information for the preparation of this 
paper.  We would like to thank the Chamber of Pension Funds in Poland for its support.  
2 
 
 
List of content 
 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 
1. The minimum pension in Poland – design, level and recipiency rate.................................... 4 
1.1. Design of the minimum pension guarantee in the old and new pension schemes. ......... 4 
1.2. Evolution of the minimum pension level ........................................................................ 7 
1.3. Pensioners with minimum pension ................................................................................. 9 
1.3. Poverty among pensioners ............................................................................................ 12 
2. Risk of minimum pension in the future................................................................................ 13 
2.1.  Results of microsimulation projections........................................................................ 13 
2.2. Population at risk of minimum pension ........................................................................ 17 
Summary and conclusions........................................................................................................ 20 
References ................................................................................................................................ 21 
Annex ....................................................................................................................................... 22 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
 
In the ageing world, pensions systems’ design frequently evolves towards systems that are 
based on actuarially neutral principle. Notional-defined contribution (NDC) scheme is an 
example of such change, introduced in Italy, Sweden, Poland and Italy. Holzmann and Palmer 
(2006) describe the design features of the NDC that make them desirable, compared to the 
counterfactual design of the defined benefit scheme. First, NDC’s are fair in the sense that 
two persons from the same birth cohort who make the same contributions into the scheme in 
the same period can expect to receive the same pension right for these. Second, a generic 
NDC is, in principle financially stable. The system is geared to maintain long-run equivalence 
between assets and liabilities at an unchanged contribution rate. The former means that NDC 
scheme is a mechanism for income allocation over the life-cycle, which has less distortive 
effect on the labour market. The latter feature is particularly important in the light of 
population ageing, when changing age structure of the population will create additional fiscal 
pressure on pension systems.  
 
However, a shift towards NDC, or generally, defined-contribution scheme, regardless the 
financing mechanism, also means that the distribution of future pensions to a large extent 
mimics the distribution of wages, as there is no income redistribution in the pension formula.  
As a result, those with lower wages and shorter working careers, can expect pensions that 
represent lower fraction of their earnings compared to most of the defined-benefit systems.  
 
In that light, the need for a design of the mechanism in the pension system that can offer 
protection against poverty in the old-age becomes an important component of the overall 
pension scheme design. Chłoń et al (2001) point out that there is an inherent conflict between 
the objective of reducing distortions caused by the pension system on the labour market and 
the goal of providing adequate income. This conflict forces each country to develop its own 
structural compromise, which reflects its own unique social history, economic situation and 
political preferences.  
 
Countries deal with this problem through one of the five different approaches or some 
combination of them. These include: (i) citizens’ pensions; (ii) contributory, flat pensions; 
(iii) progressive benefit formulae; (iv) minimum pensions and (v) income-tested supplements. 
The issue of providing adequate income protection for the old-age plays an important role in 
the international debate. Answers to that challenge depend highly on countries’ 
characteristics. This ranges from the issue of assuring the adequate coverage of pension 
systems, in particularly in the developing countries, to the goal related to the adequacy of 
pension levels, which has been formulated in the pension strand of the social Open Method of 
Co-ordination in the European Union.   
 
Poland, on its way to reform the pension system from defined-benefit to defined-contribution 
based, also changed the design and role of its minimum pension guarantee. Yet, the level of 
minimum pension guarantee and the rules for its uprating have not changed. This means that 
with time, the population at risk of falling below the minimum pension level will decrease, 
mainly due to the relative decrease of the level of the guarantee. In the paper, we aim to 
estimate the impact of individual characteristics (such as length of working career and wage 
history) as well as minimum pension level on the probability of receiving the minimum 
pension.   
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In the first section we present the current design of the minimum pension guarantee in Poland. 
In the second section, we present changes in the level of minimum pension and changes in the 
recipiency rate over the past decade. We also compare the evolution of the minimum pension 
level compared to average wage as well as poverty threshold in Poland. In the third section, 
we present projections of the future level of minimum pension, depending on the development 
of the wage level. In the third section we present results of microsimulations of future pension 
levels, with particular focus of the impact of wage level and work history as well as pension 
system’s performance on the future pension level. We also analyse, based on 
mircosimulations, the potential risk of falling below minimum pension level over time. 
Finally, we provide some conclusions and recommendations regarding the development of the 
minimum pension guarantee in Poland in the future.  
  
1. The minimum pension in Poland – design, level and 
recipiency rate 
 
In this section, we present the design of the minimum pension guarantee in the old and new 
pension systems. We also present the historical development of the value of minimum 
pension and number of pensioners receiving minimum pension in the past years. These reflect 
mainly the result of guarantees in the old pension system, as all pensions granted until the end 
of 2008 were based on the old systems’ rules.   
1.1. Design of the minimum pension guarantee in the old and new 
pension schemes. 
The new pension system in Poland, introduced in 1999, also changed the design and financing 
of the minimum pension. The new system firstly moved towards a defined contribution 
scheme, which means that future pension levels will be linked to lifetime history of 
contributions, with earned interest.  Also the financing of the new pension  system changed. 
The old-age contribution (19.52% of wage) was split between two accounts.  
 
The first one, NDC account, is held in the social insurance institution. The contribution of 
12.22% of wage is recorded on the individual account in the NDC scheme and earns an 
interest rate equal to the change in the overall contribution revenue, which represents the 
changes in the covered wage bill growth. The second one, FDC account, is held in an open 
pension fund, that invests assets on the financial market. Each month, a contribution of 7,3% 
of wage is transferred to the chosen pension fund. The FDC account earns a rate of return that 
is linked to the financial market performance.  
 
The resulting old-age pension is calculated based on the value of accumulated assets in both 
accounts and unisex life expectancy at retirement age. Thus, there is no progressivity or 
redistribution in the pension formula, apart from the one resulting from differences in life 
expectancy of men and women. The minimum retirement age is different for men and women. 
Women can retire from age 60 and men from age 654. This means that the individual 
replacement rate for persons retiring at the same age, whose individual pension relative to 
average pension was relatively stable is constant. That means, that those that earn 50% of 
average wage and those that earn 200% of average wage can expect to receive the same 
                                                 
4
 Detailed description of the new pension system in Poland is included in: Góra and Rutkowski (2000), Chłoń, 
Góra and Rutkowski (2000), Chłoń-Domińczak (2002).  
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proportion of their earnings at retirement. As a result, the distribution of pension level should 
follow the distribution of earnings, and differences will be due to different wage levels, length 
of work and differences in retirement age. It should be noted, that different retirement age of 
men and women can lead to a significant disproportion of men’s and women’s pensions. 
Women, retiring five years earlier will have not only lower retirement age, but also shorter 
working career. Combining that with lower wage level, due to gender wage gap, the risk of 
low pension benefits will be higher for women in the future.  
 
The new pension system covers workers and self-employed5 that were born in 1949 or later. 
In this group, those born between 1968 and 1949 had an option whether to split their 
contribution between NDC and FDC account or have only NDC account. All pension rights 
accrued before the end of 1998 (prior to reform implementation) were recalculated into the 
initial capital, credited to the NDC account.   
 
In the new pension system, the minimum pension guarantee is detached from contributory 
financing and moved to the state budget and general revenue financing. If the total pension (a 
sum of NDC and FDC pension) is below minimum level, then the pension is supplemented by 
the minimum pension guarantee, which is financed from the state budget. This is subject to 
the eligibility criteria, that is achieving minimum retirement age and work experience of 20 
years for women and 25 years for men.   
 
As a result, the two objectives of the pension system: income allocation over the lifecycle and 
providing protection against poverty at old age are separated and also based on separate 
financing. The latter has a broader base, similar to other benefits targeted at income support of 
low-income citizens.  
 
Thus, there are potential three sources of financing of the old-age pension in the new system: 
minimum pension guarantee from the general revenue, NDC pension financed from the pay-
as-you-go system revenues and FDC pension financed from assets accumulated in open 
pension funds, which is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Gross relative pension level by sources of financing in the new pension system. 
 
Source: authors’ estimates based on the OECD (2009 
                                                 
5Only self-employed outside agriculture. Farmers have separate pension system in Poland.   
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In the old defined-benefit system, the minimum pension guarantee was build into the general 
pension system formula. The benefit formula was progressive with a constant component 
equal to 24 per cent of the average wage. Each year of work increased the pension level by 
1.3 percent of individual’s wage component, that was calculated based on best wage in 10 
years chosen from past 20 years of wage history, adjusted for changes in inflation and average 
wage levels. As a result, the distribution of pensions was more concentrated that wage 
distribution, which reduced the risk of falling below minimum pension level.  
 
However, if an accrued pension was below the minimum level and the eligibility criteria were 
met, the pension was increased to the minimum level. Financing of the minimum pension was 
from the social security systems’ revenue (from contributions and state budget subsidies). 
Eligibility criteria for receiving the minimum old-age pension were similar to the ones in the 
new system.  
 
There are two general factors of individual’s work history that have significant impact on the 
risk of minimum pension. These include the lifetime wages and covered by social security 
work tenure.  
 
Distribution of wage base level for pension calculation and the distribution of old-age 
pensions  level is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of wage base for pension calculation and old-age pension levels in 2008 (in PLN) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Social Insurance Institution and Central Statistical Office data 
 
The distribution of wage base for pension calculation in the old system (as shown in Figure 2) 
takes into account wage developments from past 20 years of work history. As one can see, the 
distribution of pension level is concentrated around the average value of PLN 1 471 per 
month., while the distribution of wage level for pension calculation is more dispersed 
compared to the average of PLN 2 128.  
 
Labour market developments in the past decades will have a significant impact on the total 
length of work covered by social security.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of total numbers of years worked by age, sex and source of the data. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
T
e
n
u
re
 i
n
 y
e
a
rs
Males LFS total population
Females LFS total population
Males SES employed
Females SES employed
 
Source: Own calculations based on SES and LFS data 
 
According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, around 30 per cent of persons at retirement 
age can have total work experience below minimum period required for the minimum 
pension. If we take into account Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) data, this share reduces 
to some 10 per cent. As a result, the risk of poverty among persons in retirement age, not 
eligible for minimum pension guarantee increases.  
 
  
1.2. Evolution of the minimum pension level  
 
In the course of the past two decades, the minimum pension level evolved following ad-hoc 
changes at the beginning of 1990s and then, the regular indexation of pension benefits from 
mid 1990s. In our analysis we focus on the period from 1995, after the inflation level and 
indexation mechanisms stabilised after the transition movements. Minimum pensions are 
increased following the indexation of pensions. Currently, indexation is conducted annually, 
following inflation rate increased by a fifth of the wage growth. Indexation rate can be 
increased, if it is agreed in the Tripartite Committee. Such indexation was implemented in 
Poland from 1999, with a break between 2005 and 2008. In these years, pensions were 
indexed according to the inflation growth. The indexation mechanism leads to gradual 
reduction of the relation between minimum pension and average wage. Given that the pension 
system is perceived as a source of income replacement after retirement, reduced relation 
between minimum pension and average wage means that with time, this mechanism covers 
workers with lower wage levels.  
 
In order to assess the role of minimum pension guarantee as a mechanism to protect against 
poverty, we compare it to the subsistence minimum calculated by the Institute for Labour and 
Social Affairs. The subsistence minimum (also called biological minimum) is perceived as 
lowest poverty threshold. This is understood as a threshold, below which there is a biological 
risk of life and psycho-physical development of an indiviudal (Kurowski, 2002; Deniszczuk, 
Sajkiewicz, 1997). The basket for calculating the subsistence minimum was developed by the 
experts of the Institute of Labour and Social Affairs in 1995. It covers only expenditure that 
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allows for maintaining the subsistence level, such as housing needs and food. The need for 
social activities is not included in this basket. 
 
Evolution of minimum pension relative to average wage and subsistence minimum for 
pensioners is presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. Due to differences in the tax 
wedge on wages and pensions – the former are subject to social security and health care 
contributions and personal income tax while the latter are subject to health care contribution 
and income tax – we can monitor the direction of changes and not the absolute level of this 
indicator. The same applies to the comparison with subsistence minimum, which is calculated 
on the net level.  
 
Figure 4. Minimum pension relative to average 
wage 
Figure 5. Minimum pension relative to subsistence 
minimum* 
  
 
 
Source: own calculations based on Social Insurance 
Institution and Central Statistical Office data 
* subsistence minimum calculated for a single 
pensioner’s household 
Source: own calculations based on Social Insurance 
Institution and Institute for Labour and Social Affairs 
data 
 
As one can see, there is a visible reduction in relation between minimum wage and average 
pension decreased by more than 4 percentage points. The relation between minimum pension 
and subsistence minimum changes with time. However in recent years – between 2003 and 
2008 we can see also a reduction in this value. If the gross minimum pension falls below 120 
per cent of subsistence minimum, this would mean that the guarantee can only cover the 
minimum needs of pensioners. Thus, the evolution of the minimum pension level should be 
observed from this perspective.  
 
Further changes in the relation of minimum pension and average wage are determined by 
pension indexation mechanism. Given the 20 per cent share of average wage growth, with 
time the relation of minimum pension to average wage will fall. The faster the wage growth, 
the faster the reduction of this relation. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Assuming the moderate 
real increase of average wage of 3 per cent annually, the minimum pension will fall below 15 
per cent of average wage in 2027. If real wages grow by 5 per cent annually, this threshold 
will be achieved by 2020.  
Discontinuity due to one-time 
wage increase caused by split of 
social insurance contribution 
between employees and 
employers 
Discontinuity due to revision of 
methodology to calculate 
subsistence minimum. 
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Figure 6. Simulation of future minimum pension as per cent of average wage depending on the average 
wage increase 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
These simulations show that with time, under no policy change scenario, the minimum 
pension level may not guarantee appropriate income protection for the elderly and can lead to 
increase of relative poverty rates among old-age pensioners.  
 
1.3. Pensioners with minimum pension  
 
The level of minimum pension has also impact on the number of beneficiaries who receive 
minimum pension level. We can assume that with the relative decrease of minimum pension, 
the number of pensioners receiving this benefit should also decrease. Indeed, between 1995 
and 2009 the total number of pensioners (including old-age, disability and survivor 
pensioners) receiving the minimum level of benefits halved.  
 
Figure 7. Minimum benefits beneficiaries  Figure 8. Minimum pension beneficiaries as per 
cent of total pensioners, by pension type. 
Source: Social Insurance Institution  Source: own calculations based on Social Insurance 
Institution data 
 
Change in benefit structure  due 
shift of disability pensioners 
above retirement age to old-age 
scheme 
Increase of share due shift of 
disability pensioners above 
retirement age to old-age scheme 
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This reduction was particularly strong in the case of disability and survivor pensions, as 
generally these groups of pensioners more frequently are covered by minimum pension 
guarantee. The reduction, however at smaller pace, can be also seen in the case of old-age 
pensioners6, particularly in recent years. 
 
Currently, less than 5 per cent of all old-age pensioners receive minimum pension. It is also 
important to analyse at the gender distribution of the minimum benefits, which is presented in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Minimum pension beneficiaries 
Total January 2005 January 2007 January 2009 
Total 
old-age pensions 199 838 274 687 224 810 
disability pensions 538 066 351 117 251 739 
survivor pensions 195 928 167 438 134 048 
Men 
old-age pensions 30 964 42 621 35 228 
disability pensions 186 393 148 990 110 486 
survivor pensions 50 143 45 171 37 469 
Women 
old-age pensions 168 874 232 066 189 582 
disability pensions 351 673 202 127 141 253 
survivor pensions 105 207 122 265 96 573 
*) without pensions of those who have a right to farmers' benefit and without pensions paid 
based on international agreements.  
Source: Social Insurance Institution 
 
 
Data presented in the table indicates that women represent more than 84 per cent of all old-
age pensioners receiving old-age pensions, which is the highest share among all pensioners’ 
groups. This is caused by several factors, which include: lower retirement age, shorter 
working careers as well as wage gap between men and women. As discussed earlier, such 
different, already present in the case of the old pension system, can even deepen in the new 
pension system. 
 
Analysing the stock of pensioners receiving minimum pensions shows the impact of changes 
between inflow of new pensioners and outflow, caused by increases of pensions (for example 
due to working period at retirement) or, more frequently, natural causes.  
                                                 
6
 Distortion in the time series between 2005 and 2006 is due to the legal shift of disability pensioners, who were 
older than 60 years (women) and 65 years (men) to the group of old-age pensioners. As some of those 
transferred between schemes were receiving minimum pension, this affected the structure of the minimum 
pension beneficiaries, as well as relative share of minimum pensions in total payments towards disability and 
old-age pensioners.  
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We can also analyse the inflow of new pensioners with minimum level, which is shown in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Newly granted minimum pension benefits in 2004, 2006 and 2008 (data for January of the next 
year) 
  January 2005 January 2007 January 2009 
Total 
old-age pensions 3 397 4 087 4 412 
disability pensions 5 999 4 697 3 560 
survivor pensions 6 357 5 316 2 626 
Total (as % of all newly granted benefits) 
old-age pensions 2,4% 3,9% 1,3% 
disability pensions 10,0% 9,4% 7,8% 
survivor pensions 8,8% 7,8% 6,7% 
Men 
old-age pensions 747 881 920 
disability pensions 2 894 2 392 1 836 
survivor pensions 2 352 1 978 1 002 
Women 
old-age pensions 2 650 3 206 3 492 
disability pensions 3 105 2 305 1 724 
survivor pensions 3 205 3 338 1 624 
*) without pensions of those who have a right to farmers' benefit and without pensions paid 
based on international agreements.  
 Source: Social Insurance Institution 
 
In recent years, the annual inflow of new old-age pensions was at around 4 thousand benefits 
per year, which represented from 1,3 per cent to 3,9 per cent of total inflow to old-age 
pensions. The inflow of new pensioners is below the average share of minimum old-age 
pensions in all pensions in payment. This indicates that in the future the share of pensioners 
receiving minimum pensions should further decrease. 
Of all new minimum old-age pensions granted in the analysed years, around 80 per cent was 
granted for women. This shows that factors affecting higher risk of minimum pension benefits 
are still present.  
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1.3. Poverty among pensioners 
  
Changes in the number and share of minimum pension recipients can be confronted with the 
evolution of poverty among pensioners. There are two thresholds that we use to monitor 
poverty: subsistence minimum as well as relative poverty threshold, which is taken at the 
level of 50% of average equivalised expenditure of households (which is the national relative 
poverty line in Poland). 
 
As presented in previous sections, pension indexation mechanism, including changes in the 
minimum pension level lead to the reduction of relation between minimum pension and 
average wage, while the relation to subsistence minimum seems to be more stable.  
 
  
Figure 9. Relative and absolute poverty of old-age pensioners in Poland 
 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Households’ Budget Survey 
 
Widening the gap between absolute and relative poverty is a result of the methodology used to 
calculate poverty thresholds.  While the relative poverty takes into account changes in average 
income of households, which rises with wage growth, the absolute poverty is based on the 
value of basket of the most necessary goods and services. As a result, the risk of absolute 
poverty is decreasing (though part of the decrease is due to change in the methodology of 
threshold calculation), while the risk of relative poverty is increasing, as wage increases and 
other changes in income of Polish households leads to real increases of the relative poverty 
threshold.  
 
In the future, if minimum pensions are increased following the current mechanism, we can 
expect further widening of this gap.  
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2. Risk of minimum pension in the future. 
 
In the new pension system future pension benefits depend on the capital collected during the 
whole working life from contributions, level of indexation in the NDC public pillar, and 
returns from capital in the privately managed FDC pillar. The aim of the simulation exercise 
in this part of the paper is to show which combinations of tenure and wages can generate 
pension capital that would be too small to assure pension level higher than minimum pension.  
 
The simulation aims to determine which combinations of tenure and wage levels result in 
insufficient retirement savings under different assumptions concerning other parameters that 
have an impact on overall pension level or minimum wage level. The simulation is made for 
stylised work histories. It is assumed that persons can only work in the age between 15 and 
retirement age (60 for women and 65 for men). We assume constant wage during the whole 
life to keep the simplicity of the interpretation. All calculations were made in real terms as 
this assured that the purchasing power of wages is comparable in the whole period of 
simulation. Regarding tenure, the total assumed tenure was divided in equal parts between all 
years until retirement age.  
 
2.1.  Results of microsimulation projections. 
 
The simplest form of simulation is the calculation of the sum of contributions collected during 
the employment period and calculation of pension on the basis of the information about the 
expected number of months on retirement. In this kind of simulation it is assumed that wage 
growth (w) as well as returns from capital part of the system ( r) and rate of indexation of the 
accounts in NDC part of the system (g ) is equal to 0%.  
 
Sensitivity tests were carried out to check what are the consequences of the change in each of 
the parameters by 1 p.p. and to assess the influence of the different assumptions regarding life 
expectancy in the future (Figure 10, Figure 11). The increase in the rate of indexation of the 
NDC component by 1 p.p. as well as an increase in efficiency of the FDC component 
decrease the risk of the future pension lower than minimum. The influence of indexation rate 
in the NDC part of the system is slightly higher as the share of old-age contribution in this 
component is larger. The joint annual increase of g, r and w by 1 p.p. reduces the set of 
combinations that lead to minimum pension risk even further despite the fact that according to 
current regulations real wage increase by 1 p.p annually contributes to the real increase in 
minimum pension by 0.2 p.p.  
However, if we apply to the projection the relative life expectancy at retirement age in the 
year 2055 and 2060 instead of using current actual life tables, the minimum pension risk 
increases significantly. On average it increases by about 45% for women and 53% for men the 
wage level required to avoid minimum pension in the base case. The differences in the 
minimum required tenure, retirement age and the life expectancy between men and women 
contribute to the relatively higher risk of low pension of women. 
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Figure 10. Projected combinations of tenure and 
average wages that lead to minimum pension –
Females. Sensitivity analysis. 
Figure 11. Projected combinations of tenure and 
average wages that lead to minimum pension –Males. 
Sensitivity analysis. 
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Tenure
W
a
g
e
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
Female (w=0%,  r=0% g=0%)
Female (w=0% r=0%, g=1%)
Female (w=0%, r=1%, g=0%)
Female (w=1%,r=1%, g=1%)
Female (w=0%,  r=0% g=0%)e60AWG
Minimum wage
Retirement 
age
Tenure requirement 20 years
 
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50Tenure
W
a
g
e
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
Male (w=0%,  r=0% g=0%)
Male (w=0% r=0%, g=1%)
Male (w=0%, r=1%, g=0%)
Male(w=1%,r=1%, g=1%)
Male (w=0%,  r=0% g=0%)e65AWG
Minimum wage
Retirement 
age
Tenure requirement 25 years
 
Source: Own calculations Source: Own calculations 
 
The simplest assumptions about the parameters seem to be insufficient if our aim is the  
projection of the possible future risk of poverty. The observations from the past confirm that 
the average levels of all parameters were significantly higher than zero (Figure 12). The rate 
of return from FDC component (OFE) was the most volatile, but in the entire period from 
2000 to 2009 the average real annual rate of return was highest and amounted to about 5.6%. 
The indexation of the contributions in NDC component (ZUS) was more stable, but on 
average the annual real increase amounted to about 4,4% in the whole period. The real wage 
growth in the economy was relatively the most stable and on  average in real terms it 
amounted to 2,9% annually.     
 
Figure 12. Real Wage growth, real indexation rule and average real rate of return from capital in the 
years 2000-2009. 
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Source: own calculations based on the data from  Central Statistical Office, Social 
Insurance Institution, Polish Financial Supervision Authority 
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Let’s assume that the average values of parameters in the last ten years are a good 
approximations of the values of parameters g, r and w during the whole working life. The 
combinations of tenure and wages insufficient to obtain pension higher than minimum are 
relatively limited (Figure 13).  
 
The results show that if the current mechanism of minimum pension increases will be kept in 
the next 50 years all persons that fulfil the requirements concerning minimum tenure will 
have pensions much higher than the minimum pension. As a result, minimum pension will no 
longer be a viable social policy instrument. This result is an effect of increasing difference 
between the level of minimum pension and average wage in the economy (see figure 7). If we 
assume that the minimum pension will increase to maintain the relation between minimum 
pension and average wage on the constant level (i.e. 100% wage indexation), then minimum 
pension will remain as a tool of income protection for women with relatively low wages.  
   
Figure 13. Comparison of the influence of the combinations of tenure and wages that lead to minimum 
pension under current rule of pension indexation (20% of wage growth) and 100% wage indexation. 
Assumptions based on the average rates from the last 10 years and no increase of life expectancy.  
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Source: Own calculations 
 
The approach of preparing the assumptions on the basis of the observations from the recent 
past could be biased in the long term. The possible structural changes in the future economy 
are uncertain but some of them that are possible to predict can not be ignored.  For example 
the productivity and wage growth (w) in the developing country such as Poland  can be lower 
in the distant future because the gap between the developing country and more developed 
regions will tends narrow in the distant future due to the convergence. Another reason for 
probably lower pace of growth of the total wages in the economy (g) in the future is that 
because of the ageing process the labour supply after the year 2020 will decline sharply. It 
should be also mentioned that according to the latest EUROSTAT projection (Eurostat, 2008) 
the long term trends in the life expectancy would lead in the next 50 years to the increase in 
Women that are entitled 
to minimum pension, 
scenario: index 100%  
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the life expectancy of persons aged 60 by 6,4 years and persons aged 65 by 6,2 years. To 
include this possible structural changes in the analysis the next simulation based on the 
assumptions that base on the European Commission long term projection for Poland. This 
projection was used by Working Group on Ageing (European Commission, 2009) to calculate 
the long term influence of the process of aging on the public expenditures. According to this 
projection average wage growth w amounted to 2.3%, real interest rates (returns from capital) 
amounted to 3.0% and the same rate was assumed as an annual growth of pension liabilities 
from NDC pillar. The calculations were made for two scenarios: current rule of minimum 
pension indexation (index=20%) and constant proportion of minimum pension to average 
wage in the economy (index=100%).   
 
Figure 14. Comparison of the influence of the combinations of tenure and wages that lead to minimum 
pension under current rule of pension indexation (20% of wage growth) and 100% wage indexation. 
Assumptions based on European Commission’s long term projection form Poland including projection of 
the increase in life expectancy.  
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Source: Own calculations 
 
 
Under these assumptions, women with lowest wages (between minimum wage and 50% of 
average wage in the economy), can expect pensions below than minimum pension level even 
without changes in the current rule of minimum pension growth. If the minimum pension 
would be constant relative to wages the risk of falling below minimum pension level increases 
to a larger set of combinations of wage and tenure.   
Women that entitled to 
minimum pension 
scenario: index=20%  
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2.2. Population at risk of minimum pension 
 
The aim of our analysis in this part is the determination of the percentage of population under 
the risk of the minimum pension in two scenarios: under the scenario of current rule of 
pension indexation and under the scenario of 100% wage indexation. In order to achieve that 
goal we used the data about currently observed combinations of wage and tenure of new 
pensioners7. Our analysis was based on the data for pensioners retiring in 2008 at age 55-59 
(women) and 60-64 (men), that is the dominant age group in the population of new 
pensioners. We limited our analysis to these age cohorts in order to avoid the potential impact 
of the retirement age on the work tenure for pension calculation.  
As the long term assumptions of the Working Group on Ageing seem to be the most 
reliable in our main analysis we used the results of the simulations presented in Figures 14. 
The simulations that base on the average assumptions from the last 10 years were treated as 
sensitivity analysis and are presented in annex. The tables below join the information about 
the distribution of the tenure and wages of pensioners in 2008 with the results of simulation 
concerning the combinations of tenures and wages that lead to minimum pension in the future. 
It is important to mention that such a method of analysis produces the projection of the future 
minimum pension coverage under the assumption that the work “biographies” of persons in 
the new system were similar to those observed recently. It is rather not likely that this 
assumption will be fulfilled in the future, so it should not be taken as a forecast. The tables are 
organized to reflect the distribution of the currently observed combination of tenure and 
average wage (the wormer the colour is the higher is the frequency of the combination). The 
combinations under the risk of minimum pension are selected by the borders and black colour 
of the numbers.  
The results show that under that under the current rule of indexation the minimum 
pension would have a marginal role in the future (Table 3 and Table 4). It would cover about 
0.3% of men with extremely short tenure and low wages and about 2.4% of women with short 
tenure and relatively low wages.  
 
Table 3. Risk of pension under minimum for men aged 60-64 on the basis of the data concerning wage and 
tenure distribution of new retirees in 2008. Current wage indexation scenario 
up to 18% 0.10%
18% 26%
26% 35%
35% 44% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
44% 53% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.30%
53% 62% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.80% 0.80% 0.10%
62% 70% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 1.30% 1.40% 0.20%
70% 79% 0.10% 0.20% 0.50% 1.80% 2.50% 0.40%
79% 88% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 2.40% 4.40% 0.80%
88% 110% 0.10% 0.40% 0.90% 5.90% 16.90% 3.80%
110% 132% 0.10% 0.40% 3.70% 14.00% 3.60%
132% 154% 0.10% 0.20% 1.90% 7.80% 2.10%
154% and more 0.10% 0.20% 2.80% 11.40% 2.30%
 Tenure
24 and 
less 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49wage (% of average) 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The data regarding the distribution of pensioners by average wage and tenure was supplied by Social Insurance 
Institution.   
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Table 4. Risk of pension under minimum for men aged 60-64 on the basis of the data concerning wage and 
tenure distribution of new retirees in 2008. Current wage indexation scenario.  
up to 18% 0.3%
18% 26% 0.2%
26% 35% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1%
35% 44% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.2%
44% 53% 0.5% 1.0% 2.5% 0.8% 0.0%
53% 62% 0.6% 1.6% 6.0% 3.3% 0.1%
62% 70% 0.3% 1.2% 6.6% 5.9% 0.1%
70% 79% 0.2% 0.8% 5.6% 6.0% 0.2%
79% 88% 0.1% 0.6% 4.9% 5.4% 0.1%
88% 110% 0.1% 0.7% 8.4% 9.7% 0.3%
110% 132% 0.2% 3.9% 5.7% 0.2%
132% 154% 0.1% 1.9% 3.3% 0.1%
154% and more 0.1% 2.4% 4.8% 0.3%
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49wage (% of average) 
 Tenure
24 and 
less
 
*Calculations under the assumption that minimum tenure cannot be lower than 15 years 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The tables suggest that the differences in the risk of minimum pension between men and 
women are caused not only by the earlier retirement age reflected by the results of simulation 
(coverage of black numbers) but have more to do with in general lower tenure and lower 
wages of women (concentration of yellow and red cells). It is also important that the results 
show positive relation between average wages and tenure (diagonal accumulation of the 
yellow and red cells). As we can see, there is a significant differentiation of work experience 
according to wage levels, which means that those with lower wages also tend to have shorter 
total work experience, which concerns particularly women. The positive relation between 
observed wage and tenure may reflect many reasons. Usually wage level depends positively 
on experience. Higher labour force participation and wages can be also connected with higher 
general human capital or result from labour market segmentation. Lower wages and work 
experience can be also a result of discrimination of certain groups. The more visible 
correlation of tenure and wages between men and women can be a result of the differences in 
family roles between men and women.  
The significance of the differences in the distribution of wages and work experience 
can be formally confirmed both for men and for women. In order to test such hypothesis, we 
performed the analysis of variance of wages and work experience for men and women retiring 
in years 2004, 2006 and 2008 in age groups 60-64 and 55-59 respectively. Results of the 
analysis are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 5.  Analysis of variance for wages and work experience – results of F-test 
 2004 2006 2008 
Men    
F-stat 6,907 6,545 6,087 
p-value 0,0005% 0,0005% 0,0025% 
Women    
F-stat 14,363 13,407 12,996 
p-value 0,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 
Test F (at α=0,05; df: 6, 84)   
Source: own calculations 
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The results of the scenario with full wage indexation of the minimum pension (Table 7 and 
Table 8) assumes that the ratio of minimum pension to average wage remains constant. In 
such scenario 3.3% of men with relatively the lowest wages would be covered by minimum 
pension. Relatively short tenure significantly increases the risk of minimum pension, but due 
to the requirements concerning minimum tenure and pension age of men the share of men 
with short tenure is relatively low.  
 
Table 6. Risk of pension under minimum for men aged 60-64 on the basis of the data concerning wage and 
tenure distribution of new retirees in 2008. Full wage indexation scenario.   
up to 18% 0.10%
18% 26%
26% 35%
35% 44% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
44% 53% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.30%
53% 62% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.80% 0.80% 0.10%
62% 70% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 1.30% 1.40% 0.20%
70% 79% 0.10% 0.20% 0.50% 1.80% 2.50% 0.40%
79% 88% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 2.40% 4.40% 0.80%
88% 110% 0.10% 0.40% 0.90% 5.90% 16.90% 3.80%
110% 132% 0.10% 0.40% 3.70% 14.00% 3.60%
132% 154% 0.10% 0.20% 1.90% 7.80% 2.10%
154% and more 0.10% 0.20% 2.80% 11.40% 2.30%
45-49wage (% of average) 
 Tenure
24 and 
less 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
 
 
Table 7. Risk of pension under minimum for women aged 55-59 on the basis of the data concerning wage 
and tenure distribution of new retirees in 2008. Full wage indexation scenario.   
up to 18% 0.3%
18% 26% 0.2%
26% 35% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1%
35% 44% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.2%
44% 53% 0.5% 1.0% 2.5% 0.8% 0.0%
53% 62% 0.6% 1.6% 6.0% 3.3% 0.1%
62% 70% 0.3% 1.2% 6.6% 5.9% 0.1%
70% 79% 0.2% 0.8% 5.6% 6.0% 0.2%
79% 88% 0.1% 0.6% 4.9% 5.4% 0.1%
88% 110% 0.1% 0.7% 8.4% 9.7% 0.3%
110% 132% 0.2% 3.9% 5.7% 0.2%
132% 154% 0.1% 1.9% 3.3% 0.1%
154% and more 0.1% 2.4% 4.8% 0.3%
45-49wage (% of average) 
 Tenure
24 and 
less 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
 
*Calculations under the assumption that minimum tenure cannot be lower than 15 years 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The results for the women are different. Under full wage indexation the 41.1% of women would be covered by 
minimum pension. Such a large percentage is a result of relatively lower pension age, lower average tenure and 
wages and high frequencies of relatively low wages and short tenure.    
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Summary and conclusions  
 
The aim of our analysis was to investigate current and potential future developments of the 
pension system in Poland and its parameters on the role of the minimum pension provision in 
the new pension system in Poland. The new pension system. based on the defined-
contribution mechanism. reduces almost entirely the income redistribution within the pension 
system. That means that the minimum pension guarantee is the principal mechanism of 
income protection of old-age pensioners in the future.  
 
Currently, minimum pension in Poland is at level of some 22 per cent of average wage. This 
relation has been decreasing, following relatively fast development of average wage on the 
one hand and pension indexation that included up to a fifth of real wage growth on the other 
hand. Assuming further productivity and wage growth in Poland, we can expect that no policy 
change in minimum pension indexation will lead to further decrease of share of  minimum 
pension in average wage.  
 
The level of minimum pension relative to wages has a impact on the actual scope of this 
guarantee. We can already observe that in the past decade the number of minimum pension 
beneficiaries in Poland has been falling, which can be partially explained by changes in 
minimum pension level and partially by general growth of wages leading to higher levels of 
new pensions granted. Evolution of minimum pension level influences also the risk of poverty 
among pensioners. In particular, the risk of relative poverty increases, as the poverty 
thresholds is related to median equivalised income changes, that take into account, among 
others, development of wage levels.  
 
Results of presented microsimulations show, that maintaining the current rules of pension 
indexation and assuming similar wage growth and financial market returns as observed in the 
past decade will significantly reduce potential combinations of wage and tenure at retirement 
age that can lead to the risk of minimum pension. Introduction of longevity changes to the 
microsimulations show that in the future the overall share of minimum pension beneficiares is 
likely to be rather small. However, the relative value of the guarantee will be also lower. By 
mid 2020, the minimum pension should represent less that 15 per cent of average wage, which 
would be two thirds of current figure.  
 
The minimum pension guarantee in Poland does not provide a stable guarantee of (relative) 
poverty protection for the old-age, in particular for persons with low wages and low work 
experience. The latter applies particularly to women. Additionally, women can expect lower 
pensions due to lower retirement age. Thus, the minimum pension provision in Poland 
requires changes, that would lead to a higher link of protection of elderly against poverty in 
the future. The minimum pension level should be established based on independent 
parameters focusing on its role to protect the elderly from  poverty risk.   
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Annex 
Under the baseline scenario (w=0%, r=0%, g=0%) the population at risk of minimum pension 
under the assumption mentioned above is close to 0.9% for men and 1.3% for women. The 
most exposed to the risk of very low pension benefits are persons with the shortest tenure 
Using the results of simulations presented in Figures 12 and 13 we assessed the overall impact 
of the base scenario and sensitivity analysis on the size of population at risk, if the rules of the 
new pension system were applied to current pensioners (Table 8 and Table 9) . 
Table 8. Risk of pension under minimum for men aged 60-64 on the basis of the data concerning wage and 
tenure distribution of new retirees in 2008 (grey fields  – coverage of minimum pension). Baseline 
scenario, current indexation rule. 
 Tenure 
wage (% of 
average)  
24 and 
less* 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
50 and 
more 
up to 18% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
18% 26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
26% 35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
35% 44% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 
44% 53% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 
53% 62% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.80% 0.80% 0.10% 0.00% 
62% 70% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 1.30% 1.40% 0.20% 0.00% 
70% 79% 0.10% 0.20% 0.50% 1.80% 2.50% 0.40% 0.00% 
79% 88% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 2.40% 4.40% 0.80% 0.00% 
88% 110% 0.10% 0.40% 0.90% 5.90% 16.90% 3.80% 0.00% 
110% 132% 0.00% 0.10% 0.40% 3.70% 14.00% 3.60% 0.00% 
132% 154% 0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 1.90% 7.80% 2.10% 0.00% 
154% and more 0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 2.80% 11.40% 2.30% 0.00% 
 
Table 9. Risk of pension under minimum for women aged 55-59 on the basis of the data concerning wage 
and tenure distribution of new retirees in 2008 (grey fields  – coverage of minimum pension). Baseline 
scenario, current indexation rule. 
 Tenure 
wage (% of 
average)  
24 and 
less 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
50 and 
more 
up to 18% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
18% 26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
26% 35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
35% 44% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 
44% 53% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 
53% 62% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.80% 0.80% 0.10% 0.00% 
62% 70% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 1.30% 1.40% 0.20% 0.00% 
70% 79% 0.10% 0.20% 0.50% 1.80% 2.50% 0.40% 0.00% 
79% 88% 0.10% 0.20% 0.40% 2.40% 4.40% 0.80% 0.00% 
88% 110% 0.10% 0.40% 0.90% 5.90% 16.90% 3.80% 0.00% 
110% 132% 0.00% 0.10% 0.40% 3.70% 14.00% 3.60% 0.00% 
132% 154% 0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 1.90% 7.80% 2.10% 0.00% 
154% and more 0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 2.80% 11.40% 2.30% 0.00% 
*Calculations under the assumption that minimum tenure cannot be lower than 15 years 
Source: Own calculations 
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The risk of minimum pension disappears if the assumptions based on the average wage, NDC 
and FDC returns the last 10 years are applied and the rules of pension indexation remain 
unchanged. If we assume that the minimum pension stays on the same level relative to 
average wage, the risk of minimum pension is lower compared to baseline. The 0.2% of men 
and 0.6% of women can fall below minimum pension guarantee, which is a reduction of 0,7 
p.p. for both genders. That means that expected economic and labour market development 
reduces the risk of receiving the minimum pension in the future.  
 
